In the model of no-dictionary searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) schemes, the client does not need to keep the list of keywords W. In this paper, we first show a generic method to transform any passively secure SSE scheme to a no-dictionary SSE scheme such that the client can verify search results even if w W. In particular, it takes only O(1) time for the server to prove that w W. We next present a no-dictionary SSE scheme such that the client can hide even the search pattern from the server. key words: searchable symmetric encryption, dictionary, verifiable, search pattern
Introduction

Background
The notion of searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) schemes was introduced by Song et al. [34] . In the store phase, a client encrypts a set of files and an index table by a symmetric encryption scheme, and then stores them on an untrusted server. In the search phase, he can efficiently retrieve the matching files for a search keyword w keeping the keyword and the files secret.
Since then, single keyword search SSE schemes [15] , [16] , [19] , [24] , [26] , dynamic SSE schemes [13] , [21] , [22] , [25] , [27] , [30] , verifiable SSE schemes [24] - [27] , [35] , multiple keyword search SSE schemes [1] , [7] , [12] , [20] , [23] , [36] and more [14] have been studied extensively by many researchers.
Curtmola, et al. [16] , [17] gave a rigorous definition of privacy against honest but curious servers. Kurosawa and Ohtaki [24] , [26] showed a definition of reliability against malicious servers who may return incorrect search results to the client, or may delete some encrypted files to save her memory space. An SSE scheme is called verifiable if it satisfies both privacy and reliability.
Let D = {D 1 , . . . , D N } be the set of files and W = {w 1 , . . . , w m } be the set of keywords, where each keyword w is contained in some file(s). We call W a dictionary.
Let ID (w) = { j | D j contains w}. Then an index
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table T is defined as T = (ID (w 1 ), . . . , ID (w m )), where w i ∈ W. Let I be an encryption of T . In the store phase, the client sends I and an encryption of D to the server. We say that an SSE scheme is a no-dictionary SSE scheme if the client does not need to keep W. In usual SSE schemes, the client does not need to keep W. However, there are some exceptional cases. In this paper, we study two cases in which it is non-trivial to design an efficient nodictionary SSE scheme. (The notion of no-dictionary SSE schemes was first studied by Taketani and Ogata [35] in the setting of verifiable SSE schemes.)
No-Dictionary SSE with Search Pattern Hiding
The search pattern is the information on which past queries are the same as the current one, where a query is an encryption of a search word w. In usual SSE schemes, the search pattern is leaked to the server.
If the client keeps a dictionary W, we can construct a search pattern hiding SSE scheme by using the technique of private information retrieval (PIR) [29] , [32] † (The cost for it is that the communication complexity and the computation complexity increase.).
In the store phase, the client stores an encrypted index table I 0 = (I 0 [1] , . . . , I 0 [m]) such that I 0 [i] is an encryption of T [i](= ID (w i )), where w i ∈ W for each i. In the search phase, by using PIR, he obtains I 0 [i] from the server without revealing any information on the search word w i ∈ W. This means that the search pattern is hidden from the server. He finally retrieves encryptions of all D j such that j ∈ T [i] from the server.
If the client does not want to keep W (i.e. no-dictionary SSE), there is a simple way to modify the above scheme. Let b be the bit length of the longest keyword in W, and let π : {0, 1} ≤b → {0, 1} ℓ be an injection for some ℓ. The client constructs an extended index table T e of size 2 ℓ such that T e [π(w)] = ID (w). Then he stores I e = (I e [1] , . . . , I e [2 ℓ ]) such that I e [i] is an encryption of T e [i] to the server, and keeps only (b, π). In this way, we can obtain a no-dictionary search-pattern hiding SSE scheme. However, I e is much larger than I 0 because 2 ℓ ≫ |W | in general.
No-Dictionary Verifiable SSE
Consider a verifiable SSE scheme such as follows. The client stores I 1 = ((a 1 , b 1 , c 1 ) , . . . , (a m , b m , c m )) to the server such that
for each w i ∈ W, where F is a pseudorandom function and k 1 , k 2 are keys. To search on w, the client sends
to the server. The server finds i such that a ′ = a i and returns the search result with MAC(a i , b i ).
Is it a no-dictionary verifiable SSE scheme? The answer is no because a malicious server can cheat by saying that a ′ {a 1 , . . . , a m } (namely w W) even if a ′ ∈ {a 1 , . . . , a m }. The client has no way to check this.
We can prevent this cheating by using the extended index table T e defined in Sect. 1.2. However, the encrypted I e gets much larger than I 1 (see Sect. 1.2).
For this problem, Taketani and Ogata [35] showed a no-dictionary verifiable SSE scheme such that the encrypted index table is almost the same size as I 1 . In this scheme, however, the server takes O(N log(N m)) time to prove that w W, where N = |D| and m = |W |.
Our Contribution
In this paper, we first show a generic method to transform any passively secure SSE scheme to a no-dictionary verifiable SSE scheme. In the transformed scheme, the encrypted index table is only a few times larger than that of the underlying SSE scheme, and the server takes only O(1) time to prove that w W, which is more efficient than the scheme in [35] . The search time for w ∈ W remains almost the same as that of the original SSE scheme. We also prove that the transformed scheme is UC-secure in Appendix similarly to [24] , [26] .
We next present a no-dictionary search-pattern hiding SSE scheme such that the encrypted index table is only a few times larger than I 0 (As in the corresponding dictionary SSE scheme, the cost for it is that the communication complexity and the computation complexity increase.) † .
We use Cuckoo Hashing [33] in both our results as a main technical tool.
Remark
In the verifiable SSE schemes of [24] - [27] , the set of keywords is defined as W = {0, 1} ℓ . In reality, however, keywords have various length. Therefore we must use the technique of Sect. 1.2 in practice. † This part was not written in the conference version [31] of this paper.
If we use an oblivious RAM (ORAM) in a dynamic SSE scheme [18] (in which the client can update files), we can hide the search pattern and the access pattern. In such a scheme, however, the client must keep the dictionary (or a corresponding list). The communication cost is also large.
Verifiable Searchable Symmetric Encryption
In this section, we define a no-dictionary (verifiable) SSE scheme and its security. Basically, we follow the notation used in [12] , [24] , [26] .
• Let D = {D 1 , . . . , D N } be the set of files.
• Let W be the set of keywords, where each keyword w is contained in some file(s).
• For w ∈ {0, 1} * , define as follows:
Note that
If X is a bit string, |X | denotes the bit length of X. If X is a set, |X | denotes the cardinality of X. "PPT" refers to probabilistic polynomial time, and "PT" refers to polynomial time.
Model
An SSE scheme has two phases, the store phase (which is executed only once) and the search phase (which is executed a polynomial number of times). In the store phase, the client encrypts all files in D and stores them on the server. In the search phase, the client sends a ciphertext of a word w, and the server returns C(w). If there is a mechanism to verify the validity of C(w), the scheme is called a verifiable SSE (vSSE).
Formally, a vSSE scheme consists of the following four polynomial-time algorithms vSSE = (Setup, Trpdr, Search, Dec) as follows:
a PPT algorithm that generates a key K, an encrypted index I, and the set of encrypted files C = {C 1 , . . . , C N }, where λ is a security parameter. This algorithm is run by the client in the store phase. He then stores (I, C) on the server.
• t(w) ← Trpdr(K, w): a PPT algorithm that outputs a trapdoor t(w) for w ∈ {0, 1} * . This algorithm is run by the client in the search phase. t(w) is sent to the server. We say that a vSSE satisfies correctness if the following holds for any K, D, W, {(w, D (w)) | w ∈ W } and any word w ∈ {0, 1} * .
• If
We assume that C * is equal to C(w)(⊂ C) as in most existing schemes. An (not verifiable) SSE scheme is defined by omitting Proof.
Security Definition
We next define the security of vSSE schemes. Note that a search word w does not need to belong to the set W.
Privacy. In a (v)SSE, the server should learn almost no information on D, W, and the search word w. Let L 1 (D, W ) denote the information that the server can learn in the store phase, and let L 2 (D, W, w, w) denote that in the search phase, where w is the current search word and w = (w 1 , w 2 , . . .) is the list of the past search words queried so far. In most existing SSE schemes,
The search pattern reveals which past queries are the same as w.
. The client's privacy is defined by using two games: a real game Game r eal and a simulation game Game 
, and sends them to C. 
L-privacy, if there exists a PPT simulator S such that
is negligible for any PPT adversary A.
Reliability. In an SSE scheme, a malicious server might cheat a client by returning a false resultC * ( C(w)) during the search phase. (Weak) reliability guarantees that the client can detect such a malicious behavior. Formally, reliability is defined by game Game r eli shown in Fig. 3 , which is played by an adversary B = (B 1 , B 2 ) (malicious server) and a challenger C. B 1 and B 2 are assumed to be able to communicate freely. For SSE schemes in which C * = C(w) is assumed to be returned as a search result, strong reliability was also defined in [26] . In strong reliability, the server has to answer a wrong pair (C * , Proof)( (C(w), Proof)) that will be accepted in the search phase to win the game. (Search phase) For i = 1, . . . , q, do 1. B 1 chooses w i ∈ {0, 1} * and sends it to C. 
C sends the trapdoor t (w
i ) ← Trpdr(K, w i ) to B 2 . 3. B 2 returns (C * i , Proof i ) to C. 4. C computes D * i ← Dec(K, t (w i ),C * i , Proof i ) and returnsD * i to B 1 .D * i can be ⊥.
Definition 3 (Strong Reliability):
We say that B strongly wins in Game reli if there exists i, such that both
We say that a vSSE scheme satisfies strong reliability if for any PPT adversary B,
is negligible.
Building Blocks
Cuckoo Hashing
Cuckoo Hashing [33] is a hashing algorithm with the advantage that the search time is constant. To store n keys, it uses two tables T 1 and T 2 of size m, and two independent random hash functions h 1 and h 2 with the range {1, . . . , m}. Every key x is stored at one of two positions, T 1 (h 1 (x)) or T 2 (h 2 (x)). So we need to inspect at most two positions to search x. It can happen that both possible places T 1 (h 1 (x)) and T 2 (h 2 (x)) of a given key x are already occupied. This problem is solved by allowing x to throw out the key (say y) occupying the position T 1 (h 1 (x)). Next, we insert y at its alternative position T 2 (h 2 ( y)). If it is already occupied, we repeat the above steps until we find an empty position. If we failed after some number of trials, we choose new hash functions and rebuild the data structure.
Let n = m(1 − ϵ ) for some ϵ ∈ (0, 1). Then the above algorithm succeeds with probability 1−c(ϵ )/m+O(1/m 2 ) for some explicit function c(·) [28] . The expected construction time of (T 1 , T 2 ) is bounded above by [28] 
Pseudo-Random Function
Let R be a family of all functions f : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n . We say that F : {0, 1} ℓ × {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n is a pseudo-random function if for any PPT distinguisher D,
is negligibly small. It is well known that a pseudo-random function works as a MAC which is existentially unforgeable against chosen message attack.
Generic Transformation from SSE to vSSE
In this section, we show a generic method to transform any SSE which satisfies privacy to a no-dictionary verifiable SSE. In the transformed scheme, the encrypted index table is only a few times larger than that of the underlying SSE scheme, and the server takes only O(1) time to prove that w W. The search time for w ∈ W remains almost the same as that of the original SSE scheme. We also prove that the transformed scheme is UC-secure in Appendix similarly to [24] , [26] .
Construction
Let SSE 0 = (Setup 0 , Trpdr 0 , Search 0 , Dec 0 ) be an SSE scheme. We construct a no-dictionary verifiable SSE vSSE 1 = (Setup 1 , Trpdr 1 , Search 1 , Dec 1 ) as follows. Let F be a pseudo-random function.
•
for each ke y j . When failing in constructing tables, go back to step 2. 5. Construct two tables (T 1 , T 2 ) of size |W | + 1 as follows:
The client sends (I, C) to the server, and keeps K secret.
For each ke y j = F k (0∥w j ), it holds that
The client sends t(w) to the server, where w is a search word.
Retrieve
The server returns (C * , Proof) to the client.
The client obtains ⊥ or D * .
Example
Suppose that there are 7 keywords W = {w 1 , . . . , w 7 } and 8 ciphertexts C = {C 1 , . . . , C 8 } such that C(w j ) are given in Table 1 . In the same table, h 1 (ke y j ) and h 2 (ke y j ) are the hash values which are used to construct the cuckoo hash tables (T ′ 1 , T ′ 2 ) for the set {ke y j = F k (0∥w j ) | j = 1, . . . , 7}.
Then T 1 and T 2 are constructed as shown in Table 2 . Note that the size of each table is 8 = |W | + 1.
(Case 1) Suppose that a client searches for a keyword w 3 ∈ W.
1. The client sends trapdoor (ke y 3 , t 0 (w 3 )) to the server. 2. Since h 1 (ke y 3 ) = 6 and h 2 (ke y 3 ) = 4, the server retrieves
Because α 1 = ke y 3 , the server obtains the search result
and returns (C * , Proof) to the client. 3. The client verifies if γ 1 = F k (3∥ke y 3 ∥C * ).
(Case 2) Suppose that the client searches for w W.
1. The client computes ke y ← F k (0∥w) and t 0 (w) ← Trpdr 0 (K 0 , w). He sends t(w) = (ke y, t 0 (w)) to the server. 2. Suppose that h 1 (ke y) = 5 and h 2 (ke y) = 3. Then the server retrieves
Because ke y {α 1 , α 2 }, the server returns C * = ∅ and Proof = (α 1 , β 1 , α 2 , β 2 ) = (null, F k (1∥5), ke y 4 , F k (2∥3∥ke y 4 )). Table 2 Cuckoo hash tables (T 1 , T 2 ).
The client verifies if ke y {α 1 , α 2 }, β 1 = F k (1∥h 1 (ke y)∥α 1 ), and β 2 = F k (2∥h 2 (ke y)∥α 2 ).
Efficiency
The efficiency of our transformed scheme vSSE 1 is estimated as follows:
• In the store phase, |W | keys are stored in two tables, where each table has size m = |W | + 1. Therefore, the client takes the expected time O(|W |) + time(Setup 0 ) to run Setup 1 from Eq. (3).
• In the search phase, the search time for w ∈ W is almost the same as that of the original scheme.
• The server takes only O(1) time to prove that w W because the search time is constant in cuckoo hashing.
To prove that w W, in the method of [35] , the server takes O(N log N |W |) time. In the concrete method (Algorithm 1+2) in [6] , it takes O(log |W |) + time(Search 0 ).
Security
In the all existing SSE schemes, |W | ∈ L 1 (D, W ) and {SPattern(w,
(There may be some exceptions which use oblivious RAM. But such SSE schemes are inefficient.) So, the client's privacy in our vSSE scheme has the same level as that of the underlying SSE scheme.
(Proof) Let S 0 be a simulator of the underlining SSE scheme which has (L 1 , L 2 )-privacy. We construct a simulator S of our vSSE scheme which achieves (L ′ 1 , L ′ 2 )-privacy as follows.
and gets its output (I 0 , C). Next S constructs T 1 and T 2 as follows. Note that the size of each T 1 , T 2 is m = |W | + 1.
• Choose ke y ), where π is a random permutation. Let h 1 , h 2 be the two hash functions which are used to construct (T ′ 1 , T ′ 2 ).
• For a = 1, 2 and i = 1, . . . , |W | + 1, if T ′ a (i) = ke y ′ j for some j, then choose two random strings r and r ′ , and T a (i) ← ⟨ke y ′ j , r, r ′ ⟩. Otherwise, choose a random string r and T a (i) ← ⟨null, r, null⟩. S sends (I 0 , T 1 , T 2 , h 1 , h 2 ) and C to the challenger. Let cntr ← 1, where cntr will denote the number of distinct keywords which the client has queried. S outputs (ke y * i , t 0 (w * )) as a simulated trapdoor. We will prove that there is no adversary A who can efficiently distinguish between Game r eal and Game sim .
We consider a game sequence (Game r eal , Game mid , Game sim ). Game mid is the same as Game real except that all values of F k (·) are replaced with random strings. For i ∈ {real, mid, sim}, define
Then |P real − P mid | is negligible because F is a pseudorandom function. We can also see that |P mid − P sim | is negligible from the (L 1 , L 2 )-privacy of the underlying SSE scheme. Consequently, |P real − P sim | is negligible. 2 Theorem 2: Our vSSE scheme vSSE 1 satisfies strong reliability if F is a pseudorandom function.
(Proof) We look at the pseudorandom function F as a MAC. Suppose that there exists an adversary B = (B 1 , B 2 ) who can break the strong reliability of our vSSE scheme, and B runs the search phase q times. Let (C * i , Proof i ) be B 2 's response to t(w i ) = (ke y i , t 0 (w i )) in the ith search phase, and let
From the definition, B strongly wins if there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , q} such that
By using B, we will construct a forger F against the MAC, where F has oracle access to F k .
First, F randomly chooses J ∈ {1, . . . , q}. Then, F runs B by playing the role of the challenger C (see Fig. 3 ) until the (J − 1)th search phase. During this simulation, when C needs to compute F k (x) for some x, F queries x to its oracle F k .
In the Jth search phase, there are three cases:
In this case, F outputs m ′ = (3∥ke y J ∥C * J ) and tag ′ =γ as a forgery of the MAC F. (2) Proof J = γ and Proof J = (α 1 ,β 1 ,α 2 ,β 2 ).
Since Proof J = γ, there exists a ∈ {1, 2} such that
For this a, F outputs m ′ = (a∥h a (ke y J )∥α a ) and tag ′ =β a as a forgery. (3) Proof J = (α 1 , β 1 , α 2 , β 2 ) and Proof J = (α 1 ,β 1 ,α 2 ,β 2 ) .
If there exists a ∈ {1, 2} s.t. (α a , β a ) (α a ,β a ), then, F outputs m ′ = (a∥h a (ke y J )∥α a ) and tag ′ =β a as a forgery. Otherwise F outputs "fail."
Now F succeeds in forgery if B strongly wins and F correctly predicts i which satisfies Eq. (5), i.e., Eq. (5) holds in i = J. Since F predicts J correctly with probability 1/q, we obtain that
Pr[F succeeds in forgery]
≥ Pr[B strongly wins in Game r eli ] × 1 q .
2 We prove the UC-security of vSSE 1 in Appendix.
Search-Pattern Hiding
As mentioned before, the existing no-dictionary SSE schemes leak search pattern. Namely, they have (L 1 , L 2 )-privacy (Def. 1) such that L 2 includes search pattern.
In this section, we show a no-dictionary search-pattern hiding SSE scheme such that the encrypted index table is only a few times larger than I 0 which is defined in Sect. 1.2.
We consider a model such that the search phase consists of two subprotocols. In the first subprotocol, the client obtains ID (w) = {i | D i contains w as a keyword} for the search word w. In the second subprotocol, he obtains
We focus on the first subprotocol, in which the search pattern should be hidden. The definition of privacy is the same as Def. 1.
If we use PIR in the second subprotocol in addition, we can hide even the access pattern.
PIR
PIR is a two party protocol between a sender and a receiver such as follows. The sender has a database M =  (m 1 , . . . , m N ) . The receiver wants to obtain m idx without revealing the index idx. A trivial solution is that the sender sends the entire M to the receiver. In PIR, this must be realized with less amount of communication. There exists a PIR scheme such that the communication overhead is O((log N ) 2 ) [29] , [32] .
A PIR scheme consists of four algorithms (Gen PIR , Query PIR , Ans PIR , Dec PIR ), where the first two are PPT algorithms and the last two are PT algorithms.
• (pk, sk) ← Gen PIR (1 λ ): The receiver runs this algorithm, and sends pk to the sender. He keeps sk secret.
• Q idx ← Query PIR (sk, idx): The receiver runs this algorithm when he wants to obtain m idx , and sends Q idx to the sender.
• r sp ← Ans PIR (pk, M, Q idx ): The sender runs this algorithm, and sends r sp back to the receiver.
• res ← Dec PIR (sk, r sp): The receiver runs this algorithm, and obtains res = m idx .
The sender should learn no information on idx from (pk, Q idx ).
More formally, a PIR scheme has to satisfy the following property; For any idx and idx ′ , (pk, Q idx ) and (pk, Q idx ′ ) are computationally indistinguishable.
No-Dictionary Search-Pattern Hiding
We show our no-dictionary SSE scheme, SSE 2 , which can hide even the search pattern. For each w j ∈ W, let ID (w j ) = {id 1 , . . . , id k j }.
1. Generate two PIR key pairs (sk 1 , pk 1 ), (sk 2 , pk 2 ). 2. Choose a key K ′ of a symmetric encryption scheme (Enc, Dec) randomly.
For each
Choose a key k of pseudo-random function F randomly, and compute ke y j ← F k (w j ) for all w j ∈ W. 6. Construct cuckoo hash tables (T 1 , T 2 ) that stores ⟨ke y j , ID ′ (w j )⟩. Note that
The client sends (T 1 , T 2 , pk 1 , pk 2 ) and C to the server, and keeps (K ′ , sk 1 , sk 2 , k) secret.
• Trpdr 2 :
The client sends t(w) = (Q 1 , Q 2 ) to the server, where w is a search word.
• Search 2 :
The server returns (r sp 1 , r sp 2 ) to the client.
• Dec 2 : The client obtains ID (w) even if w W. If w = w j , the trapdoor t(w) = (Q 1 , Q 2 ) is a pair of queries to retrieve T 1 (h 1 (ke y j )) and T 2 (h 2 (ke y j )). Therefore, either of res 1 and res 2 is equal to ⟨ke y j , ID ′ (w j )⟩ from the property of cuckoo hashing and PIR.
We can use arbitrary encoding methods to represent ID (w). For example, ID (w) = {2, 4, 5} can be encrypted as ID ′ (w) = Enc K ′ (010110 · · · ). In this case, padding is unnecessary because the length of plaintext is constant. This encoding is more efficient when hit rate is relatively large.
The following theorem shows that vSSE 2 does not leak the search pattern.
Theorem 3: Define
L ′′ 1 (D, W ) = (|W |, |D 1 |, . . . , |D N |, L max ), L ′′ 2 (D, W, w, w i ) = (), where L max = max w i ∈W |ID (w i )|.
If
• (Gen PIR , Query PIR , Ans PIR , Dec PIR ) is a secure PIR scheme, • F is a pseudorandom function, and • (Enc, Dec) is an IND-CPA secure symmetric encryption scheme,
and C ′ as follows. 1. As in Setup 2 , generate two PIR key pairs
Choose a random string ke y ′ j for all j ∈ {1, . . . , |W |} as the simulated value of F k (w j ).
Construct cuckoo hash tables
and C ′ as the simulated values of (T 1 , T 2 , pk 1 , pk 2 ) and C to the challenger.
, where
We will prove that there is no adversary who can efficiently distinguish between Game real and Game sim .
We consider a game sequence (Game r eal , Game 1 , Game 2 , Game sim ).
Game 1 is the same as Game r eal except that all queries Q b in search phases are replaced with Q ′ b ← Query PIR (sk b , 1). From the security of PIR, Game r eal and Game 1 are indistinguishable.
Game 2 is the same as Game 1 except that all values of F k (w j ) are replaced with random strings ke y ′ j as in Game sim . From the pseudorandomness of F, Game 1 and Game 2 are indistinguishable.
The difference between Game 2 and Game sim is that
Therefore, Game 1 and Game 2 are indistinguishable from IND-CPA security of (Enc, Dec). Consequantly, |P real − P mid | is negligibly small. 2 The above theorem shows that SSE 2 leaks no information in the search phase. However, if a user downloads the hit files C i ∈ C(w) without using PIR, the server may learn some information about the search result. In such a case, total leakage becomes L ′′ 2 (D, W, w, w) = ID (w). In general, efficiency must be sacrificed to obtain search-pattern hiding with/without dictionary.
• The search process needs two round-trip communication to complete keyword search process.
• In general, PIR is built by using asymmetric technique.
So, the scheme needs high computation/communication cost.
How to Add Reliability
By using the same idea as in Sect. 4, we can add the reliability to the above scheme. The client generates cuckoo hash tables (T 1 , T 2 ) such that
holds, where ke y j = F k (0∥w j ). Then the client checks the validity of the answer from the server in the same way as in Sect. 4.
Conclusion
In this paper, we studied two cases in which construction of efficient no-dictionary SSE schemes is not trivial, and showed that the cuckoo hashing technique can be used to solve the problem in both cases. First, we proposed a generic transformation from any passively secure SSE scheme to a no-dictionary verifiable SSE scheme. The efficiency of the transformed scheme is almost the same as the underlying SSE scheme.
We next presented a no-dictionary search-pattern hiding SSE scheme that has a compact encrypted index table. In addition, we showed that our no-dictionary search-pattern hiding scheme can be modified to a verifiable scheme with small cost. 
Appendix: UC-Security for No-Dictionary vSSE
If a protocol is secure in the universally composable (UC) security framework, its security is maintained even if the protocol is combined with other protocols [9] - [11] . The UC security is defined based on ideal functionality F . Kurosawa and Ohtaki introduced an ideal functionality of vSSE [24] , [26] . Taketani and Ogata [35] generalized it in order to handle the general leakage functions L = (L 1 , L 2 ) as shown in Fig. A· 1 .
In the no-dictionary verifiable SSE setting, the real world is described as follows. We assume a real adversary, A uc , can control the server arbitrarily, and the client is always honest. For simplicity, we ignore session id.
In the store phase, an environment, Z, chooses (D, W ) and sends them to the client.
The client computes
and sends (I, C) to the server. The client stores K † and the server stores (I, C). In the search phase, Z chooses a word w ∈ {0, 1} * and sends it to the client. The client computes t(w) ← Trpdr(K, w) and sends it to the server. The server, who may be controlled by real adversary A uc , returns (C * , Proof) to the client. The client computes D (w) ← Dec(K, t(w),C * , Proof) and sendsD(w) to Z. Note thatD(w) can be ⊥. After repeating several searches, Z outputs a bit b.
On the other hand, the ideal world is described as follows: In the store phase, Z sends (D, W ) to the dummy client. The dummy client sends (store, D, W ) to functionality F L vSSE (see Fig. A· 1) . In the search phase, Z sends w to the dummy client. The dummy client sends (search, w) to F L vSSE , and receives D(w) or ⊥ (according to ideal adversary S uc 's decision), which is relayed to Z. At last, Z outputs a bit b
In both worlds, Z can communicate with A uc (in the real world) or S uc (in the ideal world) in an arbitrary way.
Store: Upon receiving the input (store, sid, D 1 , . . . , D N , W ) from the dummy client, verify that this is the first input from the client with (store, sid).
If it is, then store D = {D 1 , . . . , D N }, and send L 1 ( D, W ) to S uc . Otherwise, ignore this input. Search: Upon receiving (search, sid, w) from the client, send L 2 (D, W, w, w) to S uc . Note that in a no-dictionary vSSE scheme, the client may send w W. If S uc returns accept, then send D(w) to the client. If S uc returns reject, then send ⊥ to the client. UC-security of no-dictionary vSSE scheme is defined as follows.
Definition 4 (UC-security with leakage L):
We say that a given no-dictionary vSSE scheme has universally composable (UC) security with leakage L against non-adaptive adversaries, if for any PPT real adversary A uc , there exists a PPT ideal adversary (simulator) S uc , and for any PPT environment Z, We can show the following theorem.
Theorem 4:
If a no-dictionary vSSE scheme satisfies Lprivacy and strong reliability for some L, it has UC security with leakage L against non-adaptive adversaries.
(Proof) Assume that the scheme satisfies L-privacy and strong reliability. We consider four games Game 0 , . . . , Game 1 is different from Game 0 in the following points.
• In the store phase, the client records (D, W, I) as well as the key K.
• In the search phase, if A uc instructs the server to return (C * , Proof) such that (C * , Proof) (C * , Proof) ← Search(I, C, t(w)), then the server returns reject to the client. Otherwise the server returns accept.
• If the client receives accept from the server, he sends D(w) to Z. Otherwise, he sends ⊥ to Z.
Game 1 is the same as Game 0 until A uc instructs the server to return (C * , Proof) such that Dec(K, t(w),C * , Proof) ⊥ and (C * , Proof) (C * , Proof).
The above condition is the (strongly) winning condition of B in Game reli . So, we can obtain
Pr[B strongly wins in Game reli ].
From the assumption, |p 0 − p 1 | is negligibly small. In Game 2 , we split the client into two entities, client1 and client2, as follows: (See Fig. A· 2(a) .)
• Both client1 and client2 receive all input from Z.
• In the store phase, only client2 sends (I, C) to the server.
• In the search phase, only client2 sends t(w) to the server.
Then, only client1 receives accept/reject from the
